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Equity Financing and Debt-Based Financing: Evidence from 
Islamic Microfinance Institutions in Indonesia 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A microfinance institution (MFI), in general, is an institution that can create financial 
inclusion for the poor, improve household welfare and reduce poverty (Littlefield et al., 
2003, Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011). An MFI is a flexible institution that can easily 
adjust to the needs of local people, especially the poor (Ahmad and Ahmad, 2009). There 
are many types of MFI, such as non-governmental organizations, rural banks, village 
banks, and cooperatives (Karim et al., 2008). However, the main problem with formal 
financial institutions (e.g., banks) is that they demand specific requirements such as 
collateral, land and wealth, before granting credit (Li et al., 2011a). These requirements 
are major obstacles against the rural poor obtaining finance to support their livelihood. 
Access to finance is important and has severe economic and social impacts, especially 
on the rural poor. The social impacts include better education, health and housing for the 
poor (Hermes and Lensink, 2011). 
 
Indonesia, an agricultural country with the world’s largest Muslim population, faces 
severe poverty problems. In 2014, over 28 million Indonesians lived below the poverty 
line, i.e., 11.3% of the population (The World Bank, 2015). Islamic MFIs are financial 
institutions that provide financial access for poor people in rural areas and follow Islamic 
principles in their operation. Islamic MFIs can play a significant role in addressing rural 
poverty alleviation predominantly dominated by agricultural activity. The principle of 
Islamic MFIs, i.e., avoiding the use of interest, is an advantage in a Muslim majority 
country like Indonesia. Moreover, institutions that have shari’a compliance financial 
products can cater to the needs of traditional Muslim households in rural areas. Islamic 
MFIs can combine their products with charity-based funds raised from zakah1 and 
sadaqat2 that enable them to distribute funds to the poorest to help them to overcome 
poverty (Kaleem and Ahmed, 2009, Ahmad, 2002). 
 
Islamic MFIs have grown rapidly in recent decades. Islamic MFIs have particular 
Islamic values that could be a solution for poor people, especially in rural areas, who are 
averse to borrowing, in part, because of their religious beliefs (Ahmad and Ahmad, 2009). 
The principles of Islamic microfinance are derived from Islamic law (Seibel and Dwi 
Agung, 2006). Islamic law specifies a financial contract without charging interest (riba) 
(Rahman, 2010a). Islamic MFIs provide financing products such as equity financing with 
profit and loss sharing mechanism (PLS) and debt-based financing products (non-PLS) 
(Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999).  
 
                                                          
1 Compulsory charity for Muslim (if their wealth exceeds the condition (nisab), equal to 85 grams of gold 
and held for a year (Haul)). 
2 Optional charity. 
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The development of Islamic finance institutions in the modern era started with the 
establishment of an Islamic bank in the Middle East in the 1960s (Ainley et al., 2007). The 
combination of Islamic finance and microfinance was first discussed in depth by Rahul 
and Sapcanin in 1999 (Akhter et al., 2009). Based on a study by Abdouli (1991), there 
are three basic Islamic finance contracts that could operate in an MFI to build successful 
microfinance programmes: mudarabah (profit-sharing), musyarakah (joint venture) and 
murabahah (cost plus mark-up). Mudarabah and musyarakah are equity financing 
whereas murabahah is debt-based financing. 
 
In Islamic finance, equity financing based on PLS is distinguished from 
conventional finance (Azmat et al., 2015). Several studies have attempted to explain the 
benefit of equity financing in Islamic finance. However, very few empirical studies 
investigate the impact of Islamic equity financing on rural households’ welfare. This paper 
aims to investigate the impact of equity and debt-based financing by Islamic microfinance 
and identifies which financing method has the greater impact on rural household welfare. 
This study also aims to analyse the shari’a compliance of Islamic MFIs’ contracts based 
on the national shari’a board of Indonesia.  
 
Using double difference-in-difference (DD) model, fixed effect regression, and two-
year panel data set, the results indicating that equity financing has more positive impact 
on rural household welfare compare to debt-based financing especially on the change in 
income. This paper bridges the gap from previous literature in Islamic finance especially 
on identify the empirical impact from two financing mechanism in Islamic MFI; equity and 
debt-based financing.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a description of 
characteristics of Islamic MFIs. Section 3 discusses the principles of Islamic microfinance. 
Section 4 provides the literature review of the paper. Section 5 discusses the 
methodology used to measure the impact of financing between equity and debt-based 
financing. Section 6 describes the data collection. Section 7 analyses the findings and 
provide discussions. Section 8 concludes the paper.     
 
2. Characteristics of Islamic MFIs 
 
According to Addae-Korankye (2012), microfinance provides financial services for 
poor people which are excluded from the formal financial sector such as banks. 
Microfinance covers financial products including savings, loan, and insurance. There are 
many types of MFIs worldwide, Table 1 presents most of the available types of 
microfinance globally. The first type of microfinance is project based, which is mostly 
funded by donors and is temporary. In general, the aim of such microfinance is to promote 
financial access to low income people and micro enterprises such as the microfinance 
development project by The World Bank in Morocco and Russia (The World Bank, 2013).  
 
Non-profit organizations (NGOs) are another type of microfinance that mostly lack 
a legal framework. They cannot accept savings but, in certain cases, they can offer a 
savings product, example of this type is Opportunity International in Australia (Opportunity 
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International, 2015). A cooperative is another type of microfinance where the ownership 
belongs to its members. It has savings and credit services for members, example for this 
type is Koperasi Simpan Pinjam (KSP) in Indonesia (Lapenu and Pierret, 2006).  
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
A private company is a type of microfinance that consists of private and public 
capital. Private capital can be local (such as local banks, clients, and employees) and 
international (such as commercial banks, social investment funds, private commercial 
funds, etc.) A private company can also be structured with public capital from the local or 
national government, examples of this type are RDS Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 
(IBBL) and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Rahman and Ahmad, 2010, Grameen Bank, 
2015). A public entity is owned by the government or state and can be a shareholder 
company with shares owned by the public. This type of microfinance is governed by 
special laws or banking laws, the example of this type is Cajas in Municipales, Peru 
(Lapenu and Pierret, 2006, Gallardo, 2001, Mukherjee, 1997).  
 
The sustainability and effectiveness of microfinance not only depends on its type, 
but also depends on the culture of the country. Some types of microfinance need special 
support to succeed, such as cooperatives or transformed NGOs (Seibel, 2005). For 
instance, special support in the form of effective regulation and supervision from an 
authorized party is needed to resolve issue on the effectiveness of members’ control in 
cooperatives (Seibel, 2005).         
  
Islamic MFIs differ from conventional MFIs. Islamic MFIs’ products and services 
must be free from certain elements forbidden in Islam (Obaidullah, 2008, Chong and Liu, 
2009). The forbidden elements preclude Muslims being involved in non-halal business 
activities, such as alcohol, pork and prostitution. Secondly, engaging in riba or interest is 
not allowed in Islam. Thirdly, gharar (uncertainty/ lack of information disclosure) and 
maysir (gambling) are prohibited (Chong and Liu, 2009). Most Muslim scholars define riba 
as the premium that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal 
amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension of the loan’s maturity (Chapra, 
2006). An example of gharar is the sale of fish in a pond without any details such as 
quantity and quality, which may lead to uncertainty for the buyer (Chong and Liu, 2009). 
 
Islamic MFIs are allowed to generate profit through two financing mechanisms, 
equity financing and debt-based financing. In equity financing, Islamic MFIs share the 
profit with their clients since two, or more, parties are involved in a profit-sharing 
agreement whereby the parties share their resources in a project and generate a return 
based on a pre-agreed ratio (Akhter et al., 2009, Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014). The other 
way to generate a profit is from debt-based financing, which is a non-PLS agreement. 
Islamic MFIs may earn a margin or fee from debt-based financing (Shahinpoor, 2009).     
 
Maintaining shari’a compliance is important for any Islamic financial institution, 
including Islamic MFIs. With regard to shari’a compliance, there are standards from 
international organisations such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and, in Indonesia, there is the national shari’a board of 
Indonesia which sets shari’a standards for all Islamic financial institutions in this country. 
Each Islamic financial institution also has a shari’a board to monitor and evaluate the 
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shari’a compliance of the institution. This board is evaluated and monitored by the 
national shari’a board of Indonesia. 
  
3. The principles of Islamic microfinance 
 
There are two financing principles in Islamic microfinance. The first is equity 
financing which uses PLS mechanisms such as mudarabah and musyarakah. The 
second principle is debt-based financing which uses non-PLS mechanisms. Popular 
contracts under this type of financing are murabahah and ijarah.  
 
a. Equity financing 
 
According to Dusuki and Abdullah (2006), the ideal financing model for Islamic 
microfinance is equity financing. However, equity financing is less popular than debt-
based financing (Paul and Presley, 1999, Chong and Liu, 2009). The first reason is the 
moral hazard problem associated with the ex-post information asymmetry, which is more 
likely to occur with an equity financing contract. The entrepreneur (the one receiving 
finance) has an incentive to manipulate the profit report (reduce the profit). The moral 
hazard problem can also occur in a mudarabah (profit-sharing) contract because 
entrepreneurs can undertake high-risk projects whereby they gain profit and bear no 
losses from the business (Chong and Liu, 2009). PLS contracts expose institutions to 
business risk since most Islamic MFIs act as intermediaries that are not involved in the 
management of the projects (Ibrahim and Mirakhor, 2014). 
    
Equity financing with a PLS contract represents the true spirit of Islamic 
microfinancing, which differs significantly from the conventional interest-based system. 
Asutay (2007) argues that equity financing and PLS contracts are the solution to achieve 
justice and equality and meet not only the maqasid al-shari’a (objective of shari’a), but 
also the objectives of Islam. This is because, in these contracts, both parties share the 
profit or loss based on a pre-agreed ratio instead of a fixed return; it is a unique and 
attractive feature of Islamic microfinance (Azmat et al., 2015, Chong and Liu, 2009, 
Ibrahim and Mirakhor, 2014).    
 
Equity financing with a PLS contract is mainly based on mudarabah (profit-sharing) 
and musyarakah (joint venture). A mudarabah contract is a profit-sharing agreement 
where the Islamic MFI provides all the capital needed in the business or project and the 
clients give their effort and time to the project. The profits are shared in a fixed ratio and 
losses are borne by the Islamic MFI. A musyarakah contract is a PLS agreement where 
two or more parties contribute their equity to a project and profits are shared based on an 
agreement and losses are shared on an equity participation basis. This is similar to a joint 
venture agreement (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999, Chong and Liu, 2009).   
 
b. Debt-based financing 
 
The common model of financing in Islamic microfinance is debt-based financing 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000, Asutay, 2007, Dusuki and Abdullah, 2006). Debt-based 
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financing with non-PLS contracts are murabahah, bai’ salam, ijarah wa iqtina’, and qard 
al hasanah. Murabahah is a contract used for short-term financing. Under this contract, 
the seller discloses the real cost and profit of the products to the buyer. Negotiation of a 
profit margin is possible and instalment payments are common. A bai’ salam is a contract 
similar to a forward contract. Under this contract, the seller and the buyer agree to a future 
transaction whereby the buyer pays the full amount of the price and the seller promises 
to deliver the goods. The quality, quantity, price, and time of delivery are determined at 
the time of the contract signing (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999, Obaidullah, 2008).    
 
Ijarah wa iqtina’ is a lease transaction consisting of ijarah (pure leasing) and ijarah 
wa iqtina’ (lease and purchase). In a lease and purchase contract, a portion of each 
regular payment is applied to the purchase of the goods and the goods are transferred to 
the buyer at the end of a period. Qard al hasanah is the only loan permissible under 
Islamic finance concepts. This contract is a zero return loan. However, administration and 
transaction costs are permissible (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999, Obaidullah, 2008). 
Islamic MFIs may maximise debt-based financing contracts to help rural households. 
Murabahah, for instance, can be used to purchase and resell commodities in rural areas 
(Wilson, 2007). Ijarah wa iqtina can be applied to the lease of equipment or fields to a 
rural client. Bai’ salam is appropriate for farmers and traders in agricultural areas. Finally, 
qard al-hasanah is suitable for new entrepreneurs to start their business (Wilson, 2007, 
Rahman and Rahim, 2007, Obaidullah, 2008).  
 
4. Literature review 
 
There are few studies that focus on measuring the impact of Islamic microfinance 
on rural households. For example, Samer et al. (2015) study measures the impact of 
Malaysian microfinance, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM), on urban and rural household 
income. The authors surveyed 780 women in two Malaysian provinces, Selangor and 
Melaka, to measure the impact of AIM on changes in household income. They divided 
their sample into four groups including old members from urban Selangor and Melaka, 
new clients from urban areas, old members from rural Selangor and Melaka, and new 
clients from rural areas. Their multinomial logit analysis reveals a positive impact of 
microfinance on household income especially for old members. Finance from AIM also 
has a positive impact on poverty reduction, especially in rural areas (Samer et al., 2015).      
          
A study by Rahman (2010b) measured the impact of an Islamic microfinance 
programme in Bangladesh on rural poverty alleviation. Rahman’s study shows that, after 
joining the Rural Development Scheme (RDS) (a shari’a micro-finance programme) in 
Bangladesh, Islamic microfinance clients’ family income increased by over 33%; the 
clients’ religious activities increased by around 21%; and the clients’ business knowledge 
and communication skills increased by 72% and 79%, respectively. These results imply 
that Islamic microfinance not only positively impacts clients’ income but it also has a 
positive impact on clients’ attitudes (religious activities), knowledge (business) and skill 
(communication).   
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Rahman (2010b) also identifies several factors that influence the income 
generating activities of clients such as: (1) age; (2) education; (3) asset holdings; (4) land 
size; (5) family labour; (6) rural infrastructure; (7) skill-building training; and (8) morality 
and ethics. The author uses ordinary least squares and logit regression to estimate the 
impact of the Islamic microfinance programme on various economic outcomes in 
Bangladesh. The logit model was used to predict the probability of increasing the welfare 
level of Islamic MFIs’ clients. The study measures the improvement in economic welfare 
as well as in moral and ethical principles. The author reveals that the Islamic microfinance 
programme improves clients’ religious behaviour such as praying and fasting, and it 
increases household income, the productivity of crops and livestock, expenditure and 
employment.    
 
Adnan and Ajija (2015) investigated the impact of Islamic microfinance on rural 
households in Indonesia. The authors focus on the effectiveness of Islamic microfinance 
in reducing poverty. Their sample comprised clients from one Islamic MFI, namely BMT 
MMU Sidogiri, in East Java, Indonesia. Poverty measurement indicators such as 
Headcount Index, Gini Index, Sen Index, and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index were 
used to measure the impact of Islamic MFI financing. Their study concludes that most 
clients can increase their income after receiving financing from BMT MMU; the income 
increased between 50% from IDR 1,097,700 to IDR 1,669,100. BMT MMU Sidogiri’s 
financing in 2015 was able to reduce the number of respondents below the poverty line 
by 22.5 per cent, reduce the poverty gap ratio from 24 to 11.3 percent and reduced the 
severity of poverty from 0.187 to 0.079 (Adnan and Ajija, 2015, Riwajanti and Asutay, 
2015). 
 
Limited studies have investigated two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs; 
equity and debt-based financing. According to Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Dusuki and 
Abdullah (2006) and Asutay (2007), the common model of Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) financing is debt-based financing (e.g., murabaha and ijarah wa iqtina’). However, 
Dusuki and Abdullah (2006) argue that the ideal model for an IFI is the PLS mechanism. 
The PLS represents the true spirit of the Islamic finance and religious concept, which 
differs significantly from the conventional, interest based system (Dusuki and Abdullah, 
2006). There is a debate among scholars which model is better, equity or debt-based 
financing. Equity financing, with a profit and loss sharing mechanism, is also important in 
distinguishing Islamic financial institutions from conventional financial institutions 
because, in equity financing, both parties share the profits and losses based on a pre-
agreed ratio instead of a fixed return. This is a unique and attractive feature of Islamic 
finance (Azmat et al., 2015, Chong and Liu, 2009, Ibrahim and Mirakhor, 2014).    
 
5. Methodology 
 
This study uses rural households’ annual income and expenditure as welfare 
indicators. Welfare impact assessment in a microfinance programme usually employs 
average household outcomes such as income and consumption/expenditure (Islam and 
Harris, 2008, Li et al., 2011b). Impact assessment in this study involves three groups of 
Islamic microfinance clients: clients with equity financing contracts; clients with debt-
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based financing contracts; and non-clients. A major problem with impact assessment is 
selection bias. This issue can be overcome with the panel data model (Li et al., 2011b).  
 
The double DD approach is used in this study to measure the impact of financing 
by Islamic MFIs through equity financing and debt-based financing contracts. DD is a 
popular economics method to identify the impact of treatments in the absence of pure 
experimental data (Li et al., 2011b, Athey and Imbens, 2006, Lee, 2016). The method 
requires two periods, one before treatment and one after treatment (Lee, 2016). The first 
group in this study is the client group which is consists of clients with equity financing or 
debt-based financing contracts. Clients with equity financing and debt-based financing 
are rural households that received financing from Islamic MFIs. The second group are 
rural households (non-clients) that did not receive financing from Islamic MFIs (Li et al., 
2011b, Athey and Imbens, 2006).      
 
The standard DD model is illustrated by the following regression equation: 
 
Yit = β0 + δ0d2t + β1Pi + ɣMit + Ɛi                          (1) 
 
Where Yit is a rural household outcome in natural logarithm form for rural 
household i at period t. The rural household annual income and expenditure are examples 
of household outcomes. The time dummy variable is represented by d2t in which t = 2 
means the post-financing period and 0 = 1 means the pre-financing period. Pi is a group 
dummy variable equal to one if the rural household i is a client that obtained finance from 
an Islamic MFI and zero otherwise. Mit is an interaction between d2t and Pi, which is equal 
to one if the rural household i obtains finance, is a client of an Islamic MFI and the 
observation takes place in the post financing period, zero otherwise (Li et al., 2011b). This 
research follows the framework in Kondo et al. (2008) and Li et al. (2011b) with an 
adjusted standard DD model adding the area/village attributes, observable rural 
household characteristics with fixed effect estimation. Fixed effect is used in this study 
because the household specific effect is more than the individual effect. Fixed effect is 
also used to control for unmeasured household and village attributes, which can resolve 
selection bias at the household and village level (Li et al., 2011b, Islam and Harris, 2008).   
 
The adjusted DD model is: 
 
Yit = β0 + δ0d2t +αXit + ɣMit + hit + uit             (2) 
 
Where Xit is the rural household’s characteristics. In this study, we used major loss 
(ML), which is the loss experienced by rural households during the financing period that 
affected their income and expenditure (e.g., natural disaster or crop failure). Mit is the 
treatment variable that refers to financing by Islamic MFIs, hit is rural households’ fixed 
effects, that is, unobserved households’ individual or specific effect, uit is idiosyncratic 
error, δ0 is the time suffered for both groups (treatment and control), ɣ is the main 
parameter that explains Islamic MFIs’ financing impact on rural households, Yit is the 
same as in equation (1) (Li et al., 2011b, Athey and Imbens, 2006, Abadie, 2005). 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
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6. Data collection 
 
a. Survey area and data sources 
  
Data for the study were collected using a survey questionnaire administered to 
rural households from November 2014 to February 2015 in East Java, Indonesia. The 
province’s population was about 38.36 million in 2013. Based on the data from the 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia (2013), about 
32.46% of formal MFIs in Indonesia are in East Java. 
 
Our study used a two-year rural household panel data set (2012/2014) to estimate 
the impact of equity financing and debt-based financing contracts by Islamic MFIs. The 
double standard DD and adjusted DD model measure the impact on the rural households’ 
income and expenditure as well as welfare outcomes. 
 
b. Sample selection 
 
This study investigates clients of formal Islamic MFIs that are under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SME’s of the Republic of Indonesia. The 
formal Islamic MFIs in Indonesia are Islamic Financial Services Cooperatives (KJKS) and 
Islamic Financial Services Units (UJKS). In 2012, there were over 4,000 KJKS and UJKS 
and 700,000 clients in Indonesia (Sugianto, 2012).  
 
We interviewed rural household members using convenience sampling because it 
is difficult to obtain a complete mailing list of Islamic MFIs’ clients. The technique is also 
suited to finding respondents who are suitable for the research (Quinlan, 2011). The 
samples were selected from four Islamic MFIs in East Java, Indonesia. East Java 
comprises 29 regencies and 9 cities; the samples in this study are from three regencies 
in East Java.  
 
Considering the large geographic area and budget constraints, this study 
interviewed 548 respondents with 414 questionnaires useable for data analysis. The 
response rate is 75.5%; the results represent only the sample of the study. This study 
uses the Yamane Taro sample formula to determine the study sample size (Israel (1992). 
The sample size formula for an unknown population is n0 = Z2pq/ e2 and for a finite 
population is n = n0/ (1 + ((n0 - 1) / N)). This study uses a 95% confidence interval (Z = 
1.96), p = 0.5, e = 0.05 and N = 762,000. Based on these assumptions, we obtain a 
sample size of 384. However, 548 respondents were interviewed to allow for incomplete 
responses. Although this study only covers 3 of 29 regencies it is still a significant 
contribution to the literature because to date no empirical study evaluates the two 
financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs. The study identified 112 clients with equity 
financing contracts and 162 clients with debt-based financing contracts. There are 140 
non-clients in the study as a control group. 
 
This study used data on Islamic MFIs’ clients who started their financing at the end 
of 2013. This is to address the issue of Ashenfelter’s dip. Ashenfelter’s dip, sometimes 
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called a ‘pre-programme dip’ is defined as a drop or decline in earnings of individuals or 
households before a programme starts that compromises the DID results (Heckman and 
Smith, 1999). To solve the problem of Ashenfelter’s dip, Bergemann et al. (2005) suggest 
not to use individual or household earnings data that are close to the start of the 
programme or treatment. This requires the initial time period to be set early enough in 
order to avoid the dip (Perry and Maloney, 2007, Li et al., 2011b). This study uses data 
on the income and expenditure of respondents from a year before the treatment started 
(pre-treatment period). Income and expenditure data in 2014 are post-treatment period. 
 
7. Empirical results and discussion 
 
a. Respondents’ characteristics 
 
Table 3 summarises respondents’ general characteristics. The clients are divided 
into two groups, clients with equity financing and clients with debt-based financing 
contracts. The survey results indicate that most clients are male (63.9%), but most non-
clients are female (57.1%). Over a third of clients (37.6%) are in the 36 - 45 years old 
group but for non-clients the dominant group is 26 - 35 years old (36.4%). Most 
respondents are Muslim; Muslim clients account for 98.5% with small proportions of 
Protestants (1.1%) and Roman Catholics (0.4%). Similarly, for non-clients, 97.9% are 
Muslim and 2.1% protestant.  
 
With regard to education level, 38.9% of clients completed high school compared 
with 39.3% of non-clients. In terms of financing by Islamic MFIs, clients received financing 
of between 1,000,001 and 3,000,000 IDR3 (26.4%), and between 3,000,001 and 
5,000,000 (25.3%) rupiahs. These groups are followed by clients receiving over 
15,000,000 IDR (16.3%), 7,000,001 to 15,000,000 (15.5%), and 5,000,001 to 7,000,000 
(12.0%). Only a small portion of clients received less than 1,000,000 IDR (4.5%). 
 
Most clients (96.7%) need collateral to obtain financing by Islamic MFIs. Three 
financing contracts were identified in the survey; most clients have a murabahah contract 
(52.2%) followed by the mudarabah (40.9%) and small portion with a qard contract 
(6.9%). The mudarabah contract is the only equity financing contract identified in the 
survey; there is debt-based financing with qard and murabahah contracts. Some clients 
(26.2%) experienced a major loss during the financing period that affected their income 
and expenditure. 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
b. Shari’a compliance 
 
Using a 7 point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), respondents 
were asked about shari’a compliance standards (based on the national shari’a board of 
                                                          
4 In July 2017, 1 USD equaled 13,318 IDR (Indonesian rupiah). 
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Indonesia) and their financing experience. The minimum score implies that financing from 
Islamic MFIs is not compatible with the national shari’a board of Indonesia standards and 
the maximum score indicates that clients received financing that is compatible with those 
standards. Table 4 shows clients’ average score for shari’a compliance with a murabahah 
contract are 4.93 for the first statement and 5.87 for the second statement. Clients’ 
average scores for a qard contract are 5.83 and 6.16, and the average scores for clients 
with a mudarabah contract are 5.02 and 5.34 (see Table 3). In general, clients’ financing 
contracts are compatible with the national shari’a board of Indonesia standards. 
 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
c. Impact assessment with the standard difference-in-difference method for clients with 
equity financing and debt-based financing 
 
In standard DD analysis (equation (1)), the treatment variable (Mit) is a binary 
variable indicating household membership as a client of an Islamic MFI (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise). Because the estimated model is a logarithmic function, whereas the 
dependent variable is natural logarithm of the clients’ welfare indicator (income and 
expenditure), the coefficient (ɣ) of the treatment variable, when multiplied by 100, 
measures the approximate average percentage change in the indicator with respect to 
the treatment variable (Li et al., 2011b). 
   
The results of the double standard DD show that rural household welfare 
measured by rural household annual income (RHAI) and rural household annual 
expenditure (RHAE) significantly improved for Islamic MFIs’ clients. The improvement 
between 2012 and 2014 was for both financing types, clients with equity financing and 
clients with debt-based financing (see column 3, Tables 5 and 6). The average RHAI for 
clients with equity financing rose 12.4% over 2 years; for clients with debt-based financing 
the increase was slightly less (12.1%); both increases are statistically significant at 1% 
level. A positive significant improvement is also evident in RHAE for both types of client 
in the same period. To measure the true impact of financing by Islamic MFIs, the average 
outcome difference for non-clients between 2012 and 2014 (see column 6, Tables 5 and 
6) is used to approximate the time trend suffered by clients with equity financing and debt-
based financing.  
 
After differencing the means of double standard DD between clients with equity 
financing and non-clients and clients with debt-based financing and non-clients, the 
average RHAI for the clients with equity financing rose significantly by 3.2% as a direct 
impact of financing by Islamic MFIs, significant at 5% level (see column 7, Table 5). The 
average RHAI for clients with debt-based financing rose significantly by 2.9%, which is 
also significant at 5% level (see column 7, Table 6).  
 
Based on the double standard DD estimation (see column 7, Tables 5 and 6), the 
impact of financing by Islamic MFIs on all clients’ annual income is positive and significant. 
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Clients who received equity financing exhibit a greater impact on income than clients with 
debt-based financing. These double standard DD estimations assume that only the 
treatment variables impact the rural households’ outcomes (Yit) between clients with 
equity financing, clients with debt-based financing, and non-clients. Considering the 
differences and the imbalance in the three groups’ household characteristics and the 
possible association with Yit, the double standard DD can lead to biased impact 
estimation. Therefore, it is important to estimate the DD equation with control variables.       
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
d. Impact assessment with the adjusted difference-in-difference method for clients with 
equity financing and debt-based financing 
 
To minimize any biased impact estimation, this study evaluates the welfare impact 
using the adjusted DD method with the fixed effect regression (equation (2)). Tables 7 
and 8 present the adjusted DD results with the treatment variable (Mit) as a binary variable 
that indicate clients with equity financing and clients with debt-based financing. 
 
Table 7 shows that clients with equity financing, on average, increased their annual 
income by 8.1% compared with non-clients. This is significant at the 5% level. Table 7 
also show the result for the fixed effect robustness test, the result remains the same. 
 
Table 8 presents the adjusted DD for clients with debt-based financing. The results 
show that clients with debt-based financing increased their annual income by 6.8% 
compared with non-clients; this is significant at the 5% level. The RHAE for clients with 
debt-based financing decreased by 4.9%, which is significant at the 10% level. However, 
when we use the fixed effect robustness test, the result remains the same for RHAI 
(difference only in the standard error) but the RHAE result becomes insignificant. The 
control variable, major loss, is positive and significant on RHAE (at the 1% and 5% level) 
which implies “major loss” experienced by rural households will affect their expenditures 
(increase their expenditure by 9.7%) (see Table 8).     
 
Overall, the explanatory power of the fixed effects model is adequate (see R2, 
Tables 7 and 8). In both tables, the F-statistics are significant at the 1% level; therefore, 
this strongly rejects the null hypothesis of the fixed effects model in minimizing the 
selection bias in impact estimation.   
 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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Based on the results of the adjusted DD estimates (see Tables 7 and 8), the impact 
of financing on RHAI is better for both groups of clients compared with the standard DD 
estimation. In addition, clients with an equity financing contract experienced a greater 
increase in RHAI than clients with a debt-based financing contract. Overall, the empirical 
findings from this research are consistent with the findings of Li et al. (2011b) and (Kondo 
et al., 2008) where MFI financing exhibit a positive impact on rural households’ welfare, 
especially their income. The results are also similar to the findings of Adnan and Ajija 
(2015) and Rahman (2010b) that Islamic MFIs have a positive impact on rural 
households’ welfare. Clients in this study received financing only within a year, therefore, 
the significant impact only affects income and not expenditure. The evaluation of the 
Islamic MFIs financing mechanisms is a major contribution by this study and the results 
show that equity financing gives a greater impact than debt-based financing in both the 
DD and adjusted DD estimates.   
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This study evaluates the impact of two types of financing by Islamic MFIs on rural 
households’ welfare measured by income and expenditure. Using the double difference-
in-difference estimation, the results confirm that equity financing with PLS is the ideal 
financing mode for Islamic MFIs’ clients. The results show that clients with equity 
financing contracts improved their annual income more than clients with debt-based 
financing. In the standard DD estimation and adjusted DD estimation with fixed effect 
regression, the RHAI for clients with equity financing is better than for clients with debt-
based financing.  
 
Our study also reveals that financing by Islamic MFIs has a positive, significant 
impact on rural households’ welfare, especially improving their income. This shows the 
potential power of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia, particularly because Indonesia is the world’s 
largest Muslim country. However, because most clients required collateral before 
receiving financing, this result implies that most clients are not very poor, which means 
that Islamic MFIs do not really target the poorest people in Indonesia. Moreover, this study 
results imply that financing from Islamic MFI can help to improve rural household annual 
income especially with the adoption of equity financing with PLS mechanism. The results 
also open an avenue for considering Islamic MFI as an alternative institution in providing 
financial access especially to poor Muslim worldwide.     
 
With regard to shari’a compliance of clients’ contracts, our study reveals that 
clients’ financing contracts from Islamic MFIs parallel the standards of Indonesia’s shari’a 
board. This result implies that most clients are satisfied with financing contracts from 
Islamic MFIs and that there are no shari’a compliance issues in their financing. A major 
limitation of this study is the study sample. Since the sample covers only three regencies 
in East Java province, Indonesia, it does not represent the whole of East Java or 
Indonesia. However, since no empirical study has evaluated the two financing 
mechanisms of Islamic MFIs, this study makes a unique contribution to Islamic finance 
literature.        
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Table 1 Types of Microfinance  
Type  Ownership Fund Source Example 
Project Based Private investors Donors Institutions are not formalized 
(development projects) e.g., Morocco 
and Russian microfinance 
development projects by The World 
Bank  
Non-profit 
organization/ 
foundation 
Private trustees Grants, donations The Sanduk in Comoros and 
Opportunity International in Australia 
Cooperative Members Equity capital, 
deposits, 
commercial funds 
FACECAM in Benin and KSP in 
Indonesia 
Private company Private capital, public 
capital 
Equity capital, 
deposits, 
commercial funds 
RDS Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 
(IBBL) and Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh 
Public Entity Central government, local 
government, company 
with public shareholders  
Government, public Cajas in Municipales Peru and Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in Indonesia 
Sources: Lapenu and Pierret (2006); Gallardo (2001); Rahman and Ahmad (2010); Grameen Bank (2015); 
Opportunity International (2015); Mukherjee (1997); The World Bank (2013). 
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Table 2 Description of the Variables Used in Impact Analysis of Two Islamic MFI 
Financing Contracts 
Variables  Type of variable Description of variables 
RHAI Continuous Log of rural household annual income 
RHAE Continuous Log of rural household annual expenditure 
ML Dummy Major loss indicator equal to “1” if yes and “0” otherwise 
Year Dummy Year indicator equal to “1” for 2014 and “0” otherwise  
Clients (equity 
financing) 
Dummy Clients with equity financing contract equal to “1” if yes and 
“0’ otherwise 
Clients (debt-
based 
financing) 
Dummy Clients with debt-based financing contract equal to “1” if yes 
and “0’ otherwise 
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Table 3 Characteristics of the Respondents 
Characteristics of clients 
Clients with 
equity financing 
(N = 112) 
Clients with debt-
based financing 
(N = 162) 
All Clients  
(N = 274) 
Non-Clients 
(N = 140) 
Sub-
total 
% to N 
Sub-
total 
% to N 
Sub-
total 
% to N 
Sub-
total 
% to N 
Gender Female 44 39.3% 55 34.0% 99 36.1% 80 57.1% 
Male 68 60.7% 107 66.0% 175 63.9% 60 42.9% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Age 18-25 years old 3 2.7% 7 4.3% 10 3.6% 15 10.7% 
26-35 years old 21 18.8% 28 17.3% 49 17.9% 51 36.4% 
36-45 years old 42 37.5% 61 37.7% 103 37.6% 32 22.9% 
46-55 years old 32 28.6% 47 29.0% 79 28.8% 17 12.1% 
56-65 years old 11 9.8% 15 9.3% 26 9.5% 20 14.3% 
Over 66 years old 3 2.7% 4 2.5% 7 2.6% 5 3.6% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Religion Islam 112 100.0% 158 97.5% 270 98.5% 137 97.9% 
Protestant 0 0.0% 3 1.9% 3 1.1% 3 2.1% 
Roman Catholic 0 0.0% 1 0.6% 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Education 
level 
No education 4 3.6% 3 1.9% 7 2.6% 2 1.4% 
Primary school 22 19.6% 32 19.8% 54 19.7% 33 23.6% 
Middle school 29 25.9% 47 29.0% 76 27.7% 29 20.7% 
High school 46 41.1% 63 38.9% 109 39.8% 55 39.3% 
Three-year 
college 
2 1.8% 5 3.1% 7 2.6% 7 5.0% 
Bachelor degree 9 8.0% 11 6.8% 20 7.3% 13 9.3% 
Postgraduate 0 0.0% 1 0.6% 1 0.3% 1 0.7% 
Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Financing 
amount 
< 1,000,000 
rupiahs 
6 5.5% 6 3.8% 12 4.5% N/A N/A 
1,000,001 – 
3,000,000 rupiahs 
28 25.7% 42 26.9% 70 26.4% 
3,000,001 – 
5,000,000 rupiahs   
32 29.4% 35 22.4% 67 25.3% 
5,000,001 – 
7,000,000 rupiahs   
18 16.5% 14 9.0% 32 12.0% 
7,000,001 – 
15,000,000 
rupiahs   
15 13.8% 26 16.7% 41 15.5% 
> 15,000,000 
rupiahs 
10 9.2% 33 21.2% 43 16.3% 
Total 109 100.0% 156 100.0% 2654 100.0% 
Collateral No 1 0.9% 8 4.9% 9 3.3% N/A N/A 
Yes 111 99.1% 154 95.1% 265 96.7% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Financing 
contract 
Murabahah N/A N/A 143 88.2% 143 52.2% N/A N/A 
Qard N/A N/A 19 11.8% 19 6.9% 
Mudarabah 112 100.0% N/A N/A 112 40.9% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Major loss over  No 85 75.9% 117 72.2% 202 73.7% N/A N/A 
Yes 27 24.1% 45 27.8% 72 26.2% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  
                                                          
1 Only 265 of clients answered this question. 
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Table 4 Degree of Shari’a Compliance of Islamic MFIs’ Contracts  
Shari’a compliance Mean 
score 
Debt-based financing 
Murabahah (cost plus mark up) 
1. Ownership of the goods or assets belongs to the Islamic MFI before the transaction (before goods 
sold to the clients) 
4.93 
2. Islamic MFIs always disclose the cost of goods and their margin before proceeding to a sale and 
purchase agreement 
5.87 
Debt-based financing 
Qard (benevolent loan) 
1. Islamic MFIs do not ask for any benefit from the loan 5.83 
2. Islamic MFIs always consider rescheduling or write off of the loans if clients have difficulty in 
repaying the loang 
6.16 
Equity financing 
Mudarabah  (profit-sharing) 
1. Islamic MFIs contribute 100% of the capital and clients contribute the effort 5.02 
2. Losses are borne by the Islamic MFI as long as there is no fraud or negligence by the client  5.34 
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Table 5 Standard DD Estimates of Clients with Equity Financing   
 Clients equity financing (112) Non-Clients (140) DD 
impact 
estimator 
 Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(2014-2012) 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(2014-2012) 
Outcome  
Variables  Ycef,12 Ycef,14 
D1 =  
Ycef,14 – Yc1,12 Ync,12 Ync,14 
D2 =  
Ync14 – Ync12 
 
DD =  
D1 – D2 
RHAI 7.428 
(0.007) 
7.553 
(0.024) 
    0.124*** 
(0.007) 
7.343 
(0.028) 
7.435 
(0.027) 
    0.092*** 
(0.012) 
  0.032** 
(0.015) 
        
RHAE 
7.198 
(0.022) 
7.304 
(0.023) 
    0.106*** 
(0.008) 
7.090 
(0.026) 
7.206 
(0.023) 
   0.116*** 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual expenditure for the client 
group and non-client group, respectively; numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
** and *** represents 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Standard DD Estimates of Clients with Debt-Based Financing   
 Clients debt-based financing (162) Non-Clients (140) DD 
impact 
estimator 
 Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(2014-2012) 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(2014-2012) 
Outcome  
Variables  Ycdbf,12 Ycdbf,14 
D1 =  
Ycdbf,14 – Yc1,12 Ync,12 Ync,14 
D2 =  
Ync14 – Ync12 
 
DD =  
D1 – D2 
RHAI 7.437 
(0.024) 
7.559 
(0.025) 
    0.121*** 
(0.006) 
7.343 
(0.028) 
7.435 
(0.027) 
    0.092*** 
(0.012) 
  0.029** 
(0.013) 
RHAE 7.236 
(0.021) 
7.336 
(0.021) 
    0.100*** 
(0.005) 
7.090 
(0.026) 
7.206 
(0.023) 
   0.116*** 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual expenditure for the client 
group and non-client group, respectively; numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
** and *** represents 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 7 Adjusted DD Estimates for Clients with Equity Financing 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable RHAI Robust RHAI RHAE Robust RHAE 
Intercept 16.995*** 
(0.012) 
16.995*** 
(0.008) 
16.437*** 
(0.012) 
16.437*** 
(0.008) 
Year dummy ( 2 )td  
0.221*** 
(0.024) 
0.221*** 
(0.027) 
0.259*** 
(0.023) 
0.259*** 
(0.024) 
Control Variables ( )itX  
    
Major Loss dummy  
(ML) 
-0.063 
(0.045) 
-0.063 
(0.055) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
0.062 
(0.057) 
Treatment Variables 
( )itM  
    
Clients PLS  0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.081** 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.034) 
-0.029 
(0.034) 
     
F Statistic 66.36*** 112.04*** 77.15*** 91.70*** 
Household Fixed Effect Jointly significant Jointly significant Jointly 
significant 
Jointly significant 
R-squared 0.444 0.444 0.481 0.481 
Total Observation 504 504 504 504 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
**, *** represent the 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test. 
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Table 8 Adjusted DD Estimates for Clients with Debt-Based Financing 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable RHAI Robust RHAI RHAE Robust RHAE 
Intercept 17.025*** 
(0.010) 
17.025*** 
(0.007) 
16.506*** 
(0.009) 
16.506*** 
(0.006) 
Year dummy ( 2 )td  
0.212*** 
(0.023) 
0.212*** 
(0.027) 
0.254*** 
(0.020) 
0.254*** 
(0.024) 
Control Variables ( )itX  
    
Major Loss dummy  
(ML) 
-0.006 
(0.038) 
-0.006 
(0.044) 
0.097*** 
(0.034) 
0.097* 
(0.042) 
Treatment Variables 
( )itM  
    
Clients non-PLS  0.068** 
(0.031) 
0.068** 
(0.034) 
-0.049* 
(0.028) 
-0.049 
(0.031) 
     
F Statistic 87.55*** 139.06*** 110.76*** 155.67*** 
Household Fixed Effect Jointly significant Jointly significant Jointly 
significant 
Jointly significant 
R-squared 0.467 0.467 0.526 0.526 
Total Observation 604 604 604 604 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test.  
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